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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine two issues central to the tort of 
negligence: the role of reliance in establishing a duty of care; and the 
relationship between the harm-within-risk rule and the rule excluding liability 
for coincidental harm as tests for legal causation. I will use the unusual facts 
of Bhamra v Dubb in which the defendant caterer was under a duty not to 
serve eggs for religious reasons, and the guest suffered from a known egg 
allergy and ultimately died, as a platform for this analysis. 
 
While the Court of Appeal was correct in establishing a duty towards Bhamra 
on Bhamra’s reliance that eggs would not be served, it erred in limiting the 
duty to those aware that they suffer from egg allergy. Assuming there are 
reasons to avoid imposing a general duty on caterers towards those who are 
foreseeably people of ordinary susceptibility, guests avoiding a product for 
religious reasons have informational and medical susceptibilities which justify 
that a duty be owed to them. More generally, reliance on misrepresentation 
that a food served is ‘free from’ could justify duty and liability even in the 
absence of a claimant’s knowledge of his egg allergy. 
 
As a matter of legal causation, I defend the position (recently challenged in 
the literature) that the rule against liability for coincidences is different from the 
harm-within-risk rule. The injury suffered by a (hypothetical) guest unaware of 
his egg allergy is neither coincidental nor outside the scope of the relevant 
risk. It is not a coincidence, since the risk of suffering an allergy injury is 
typically increased by a ‘free from’ misrepresentation. The harm is within the 
relevant risk, since the guest’s informational vulnerability is one of the reasons 
which makes serving him with eggs negligent – the fear he would suffer also a 
physical injury. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine two issues central to the tort of 
negligence: the role of reliance in establishing a duty of care; and the 
relationship between the harm-within-risk rule and the rule against liability for 
coincidental harm as tests for legal causation. I will use the unusual facts of 
Bhamra v Dubb1 as a platform for this analysis. 
 
Bhamra attended a Sikh wedding in a Sikh temple at which food was served 
by the caterer Dubb, himself a Sikh himself. Observant Sikhs do not eat food 
containing eggs. Bhamra was aware that he had an egg allergy (I will return 
below to the significance of this fact). Some of the ras malai served contained 
eggs, probably since the defendant purchased ras malai during the wedding 
from an outside source (since the number of guests exceeded expectation) 
not being aware that it contained eggs. Bhamra had an allergic reaction, was 
taken to the hospital and eventually died. 2  The trial Court dismissed his 
widow’s personal injury claim which was based on a breach of contract and 
found in favour of Ms Bhamra on her claim in negligence. On appeal, only the 
negligence claim was litigated with the result that the defendant was found 
liable for Bhamra’s death. 
  
The Court of Appeal’s point of departure was ‘that a restaurateur or caterer 
who is providing food for people who, as far as he is aware, are of no more 
than ordinary susceptibility does not owe them a duty to take reasonable care 
to prevent their suffering harm through eating egg’, since the incidence of egg 
allergy is not high enough. 3  
 
Stripped to its essence, the Court’s analysis seems to make two propositions. 
First, that the defendant owed Bhamra a duty of care not to offend his 
religious beliefs by negligently serving food containing egg. 4  I leave 
examination of the soundness of this proposition5 to another occasion and will 
only mention here that I support it.6 However, crucially for the purposes of my                                                         
1 [2010] EWCA Civ 13. 
2 (n 1) [2], [10], [12], [25], [29]. 
3 (n 1) [19]. In assessing the risk, the Court ignored the risk to children (2% 
see AT Clark et al, ‘Egg Allergy’ http://www.bsaci.org/Guidelines/egg-allergy 
(17 March 2015)) which is higher than the risk to adults (0.1%). While an adult 
was injured, the correct assessment is of the total risk to guests, which 
presumably included children. Note also the Court’s conflation of breach 
considerations (magnitude of risk) with duty considerations (should a duty be 
owed). 
4 (n 1) [19], [25].  
5 Characterised as ‘preposterous’ by Janet O'Sullivan, ‘From snail to egg: duty 
of care, fault and food allergies’ (2010) 69 CLJ 435, 437. 
6  See T Keren-Paz, ‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy: Conceptual and 
Normative Analysis’ xx and ‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy: Three Sets of 
Confusions xx. In short, descriptively, autonomy has already been recognized 
as a stand-alone actionable damage in Rees v Darlington [2003] UKHL 52 
(albeit protected only by a conventional award) and in Chester v Afshar [2004] 
TKP, Bhamra 2, scope of liability  
 3 
argument here, one can support the court’s result that Dubb should 
compensate Bhamra for his physical injury, even if one believes that 
negligence law, or indeed private law, should not provide a remedy for 
unreasonably offending his religious sensitivities by serving food containing 
eggs.   
 
The court’s second proposition is that the duty not to serve eggs to Bhamra in 
order not to offend his religious feelings could be extended under the 
circumstances to a duty to avoid personal injury from allergy. The reasons for 
such extension are examined further below, but they revolve around Bhamra’s 
reliance—who knew he was allergic to eggs—that eggs would not be served, 
so he did not need to inquire whether the food served contained eggs.7 The 
Court went on to conclude that Dubb was negligent in not ensuring that the 
ras malai bought did not contain eggs.8 This part of the decision also raises 
interesting questions, but I will not address them in this article. 
 
The critique of Bhamra offered here examines the Court’s analysis on its own 
terms (ie does not challenge the correctness of the Court’s point of departure 
and first proposition). It is the combination of the two propositions that brings 
to the fore the relevance of reliance, the relationship between duty and liability 
for consequences as a matter of legal causation and, to a lesser extent, the 
relevance of legal causation to the analysis of this case. Bhamra is amenable 
to more traditional analysis (which partially overlaps with my analysis below of 
coincidences) if one accepts, contrary to the Court’s point of departure, that a 
caterer owes a straightforward Donoghue v Stevenson duty to warn against 
the use of eggs, since egg allergy is prevalent enough a condition.9 If so, 
Dubb was under a duty, which he breached, to warn the guests that the food 
served contained eggs. Since Bhamra was aware of his allergy he would have 
avoided the ras malai had he been warned so his damage is the factual and 
legal result of the breach. The more interesting question is the position of 
guests unaware of their egg allergy, who would have avoided the food, if                                                                                                                                                               
UKHL 41 (albeit protected by a wrong measure of the physical injury). See n 
63 below. Prescriptively, the importance of autonomy as a value, and the 
similarity between violations of bodily integrity in the contexts of non-
consensual touching (protected by battery) and involuntary consumption of 
food justify recognizing mere injury to autonomy, at least in Bhamra-like 
situations, as actionable damage. 
7 (n 1) [25]. Note that Dubb probably was not aware at the time that the ras 
malai served contained eggs ([27]-[29]), so even had Bhamra inquired, and 
received a negative answer, Bhamra would still have suffered the same injury. 
8 Dubb denied he bought ras malai from external sources but the trial Judge, 
followed by the Court, while refusing to make a finding Dubb lied (id [37]), 
based his breach of duty analysis on the assumption that external purchase 
was the explanation for the existence of eggs in the ras malai. (n 1) [27]-[42].    
9  The new Food Information Regulation 2014 No 1855 (based on The 
European Food Information to Consumers Regulation No 1169/2011) 
specifically identifies egg as one of the 14 allergens that a food business 
operator has to warn his customers against. Today, then, a duty to warn of 
eggs in order to prevent egg allergy would have been recognized.  
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warned, since they observe religious rules forbidding them from consuming 
the food served (‘observant guests’). For reasons explained below, their injury 
should not be considered as coincidental and it is foreseeable that the breach 
might cause them physical injury, so the defendant should be liable to them 
as well.   
 
Under the Court’s point of departure—that  there is no need to warn people 
with ordinary susceptibility against the use of eggs—whether Dubb should 
compensate Bhamra and (hypothetical) observant guests with unknown 
allergy raises two questions: one normative and one analytical. The normative 
question is whether there should be liability for physical injury. Here I will 
argue that while the Court was correct to hold that Bhamra should be 
compensated for the physical injury it erred by establishing liability on 
Bhamra’s awareness of his allergy. Accordingly, I argue that liability should be 
extended to all observant guests who suffer from egg allergy, whether or not 
they know about it, as well as to all guests who are aware they are allergic to 
eggs and rely on Dubb not to serve eggs, whether or not they are observant 
Sikhs. This analysis of Bhamra is contrary to the common wisdom which is 
divided between two views. One view is that the result is mistaken, since it 
ignores the fact that the harm caused (physical injury) is outside the scope of 
the risk which made the behaviour a breach of duty (religious offence). The 
other view is that the result is correct, since Bhamra’s reasonable and 
foreseeable reliance on being served only egg-free food at a Sikh wedding 
makes the allergic reaction one of the risks that rendered the serving of food 
containing eggs a breach of duty.10 
 
The analytical question is whether liability or its absence is a matter of duty of 
care (as the Court saw it) or a matter of legal causation – the scope of liability 
for consequences. My position is that, since the physical injury risk is locked-
in with the spiritual injury risk, the focus of the inquiry should be one of duty of 
care rather than legal causation. At the same time, the analysis suggests that 
even if the issue is viewed as one of legal causation, the allergic reaction 
should be considered as materialization of one of the risks which made the 
conduct a breach of duty. The risks of allergic reaction and spiritual injury are 
interdependent; therefore the allergic reaction is not a coincidence of the 
breach of the duty not to serve food with eggs and is within the scope of the 
risk that made the defendant’s behaviour a breach of duty.  
 
                                                        
10 Surprisingly, Bhamra did not receive any sustained academic analysis and 
hardly any analysis at all. In addition to a few descriptive practitioner case 
notes it received a short critical attention in O'Sullivan (n 5). The case did 
receive, however, extensive attention in the Obligations Discussion Group. 
Between 21 January and 9 February 2010, 37 views were posted. Andrew 
Tettenborn, in several posts, was the most vocal proponent of the ‘harm is out 
of the scope of duty’ camp. See e.g., Post 22 January, 2010 10:38. Others, eg 
Steve Hedley, 22 January 2010 10:49, were of the view that reliance justified 
the result. None of those intervening in this debate suggested that the duty 
should be extended to observant guests who were unaware of their allergy. 
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Section A examines the relevant reliance required for establishing a duty and 
concludes that a duty should be owed to observant guests allergic to eggs but 
unaware of their allergy, notwithstanding the Court’s starting point of no duty 
to people with ordinary susceptibility. This is so due to two types of 
vulnerability these claimants have: informational and medical.  
 
Section B is dedicated to defending this conclusion as a matter of legal 
causation. It begins by clarifying the relationship between the way a 
defendant’s duty is defined and the scope of liability for consequences. It then 
examines the rules excluding liability for coincidental loss and for harm 
outside the risk which made the conduct wrongful, and clarifies that these 
requirements are distinct, contrary to recent suggestions in the literature.11 
Finally, it explains why the injury suffered by both Bhamra himself, and 
(hypothetical) observant guests unaware of their allergy is neither coincidental 
not outside the scope of the relevant risk. 
 
 
A. Duty of care analysis: limited relevance of specific reliance 
 
The four reasons given by the Court for the existence of duty are (1) Dubb’s 
pre-existing duty to Bhamra not to serve eggs for religious reasons; (2) his 
knowledge that some people are allergic to eggs so would suffer harm if 
consumed them; (3) that guests, including those who happened to suffer from 
egg allergy, would expect the food to be completely free of eggs and that they 
would therefore free from egg-allergy injury; and (4) the reasonableness of 
Bhamra’s reliance, who knew he was allergic to eggs, of not inquiring about 
the possibility of food containing eggs being served. 12  
 
The Court is correct that guests’ reliance on eggs not being served is a 
sufficient reason to hold Dubb under a duty to take care to avoid personal 
injury from egg allergy. It should be noted that, contrary to point (1) in the 
Court’s reasoning above, the reasonableness of such reliance does NOT 
hinge on the existence of any private law duty towards Bhamra (either in 
negligence, or based on the combined provisions of consumer protection and 
contract law13) to avoid inflicting on him a spiritual injury by serving him eggs. 
What matters is that Bhamra’s reliance was foreseeable and reasonable 
under the circumstances since, as a guest in a Sikh wedding, he could expect 
not to be served eggs. It is foreseeable that people with egg allergies (and, as 
will be clarified below, whether or not observant Sikhs) would rely on the fact 
that it is safe to assume that the wedding meal at the wedding is egg-free. 
They would therefore be off guard as to the possibility of eggs being served 
during the meal. Such reliance is reasonable under the circumstances, since 
the best (if not only) strategy to avoid the allergic reaction is to avoid the 
allergenic food. For this, they need to rely on the presentations made by                                                         
11 Tamsyn Clark and Donal Nolan, ‘A Critique of Chester v Afshar’ (2014) 34 
OJLS 659. 
12 (n 1) [25]. 
13  See Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (No. 
1277); Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (Ch 31). 
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providers of food. Finally, both the reliance and the consequent injury if 
reasonable care is not taken are foreseeable.   
 
1. The (limited) relevance of reliance: duty to non-observers   
 
The limited relevance of reliance and the irrelevance of an independent duty 
owed to the claimant to avoid eggs for religious reasons can be illustrated by 
looking at the following hypotheticals:  
 
W is a non-Sikh with a known egg allergy. She attends the wedding and 
suffers the same injury as Bhamra. 
 
Y is a non-Sikh with an unknown egg allergy. He attends the wedding and 
suffers the same injury as Bhamra. 
 
Z is a non-Sikh with an unknown egg allergy. He consumes food that contains 
eggs in a restaurant and suffers the same injury as Bhamra. 
 
Dubb should be liable to W, but not to Y. Likewise, the defendant who sold the 
food to Z should not be liable. That W is owed a duty shows that duty could be 
justified on reasonable reliance, and that such reliance is independent of the 
duty to avoid serving food contrary to religious beliefs. W, of course, cannot 
sue for religious offence. She did not suffer such a loss and the duty to avoid 
religious offence was not owed to her. However, W could have reasonably 
relied (and had) on the fact that the food should be egg-free and therefore 
should be compensated for her physical injury. Even if no private law remedy 
were available to any guest for the injury to their religious beliefs, W could still 
reasonably rely on the (implicit) representation that a caterer in an observant 
Sikh wedding would not serve eggs. This example also illustrates the appeal 
of analyzing the problem as one of duty, rather than of (merely) legal 
causation. W, due to her reasonable reliance, is owed an independent duty 
not to be carelessly caused physical injury despite the fact she was not owed 
a duty not to be carelessly caused religious offence. There is no issue, 
therefore, of the harm being of a different type from that which made the 
conduct a breach of duty: the duty is imposed on Dubb to protect W from risk 
of physical injury, since her reliance on Dubb not serving food containing eggs 
is reasonable, and the harm which eventuated is within the scope of the 
relevant risk.  
 
Let us now turn to Y and Z.14 Recall that, according to the Court’s point of 
departure, there is no general duty to warn that a certain food contains eggs. 
Moreover, even if there were such a duty, warning would not have prevented 
the injury to Y and Z as a matter of but-for causation, since they are unaware 
of their allergy. It is clear that Z is not owed a duty.15 But Y’s case is no 
different from Z’s in any relevant way. Y does not rely on the fact that the food                                                         
14 I return to discuss Y in Section B4, making the observation, and explaining 
its significance, that Y is an unlikely claimant since he should have found out 
prior to the wedding that he is allergic to eggs.  
15 See n 3 above.  
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should be egg-free (since he is not aware of his allergy) and is not owed a 
duty not to be served eggs on religious grounds. Again, the denial of Z and 
Y’s claim has nothing to do with the harm-within-risk principle (nor with 
actionable damage). The harm suffered is the harm against which the 
claimant wishes to establish the defendant’s duty. But even though the risk is 
foreseeable,16 Y and Z cannot show any special factor which makes their 
relationship with the defendant proximate or makes it fair just and reasonable 
to impose liability.17  
 
 
2. Informational vulnerability: dependence on ‘permissible’ food 
 
While Bhamra’s reliance (in the narrow sense of claimant’s awareness that he 
has an allergy) is sufficient to establish a duty, it should not be considered 
necessary. Consider X, a Sikh with unknown egg allergy who attends the 
wedding and suffers the same injury as Bhamra. For reasons explained 
below, X relies (in a weaker sense) on the correctness of representations that 
the food is egg-free to protect her from physical injury. This is true, even 
under the Court’s assumption that the incidence of egg allergy among the 
invitees to a Sikh wedding is identical to that of the general population.18 But, 
as we shall see, there are reasons to believe that both susceptibility to allergy 
and the potential seriousness of allergic reaction are higher in populations 
which avoid the allergenic product for religious reasons. Consequently, the 
spiritual injury is correlated with a higher allergy risk, and therefore a duty to 
avoid the allergy injury should be imposed. 
   
At the outset, I would like to highlight a conundrum that was not addressed by 
the Court. Bhamra was aware of his egg allergy despite the fact that, 
according to his religious belief, he was never supposed to eat eggs. This fact 
is important; most observant Sikhs with egg allergy are not likely to be aware 
of it. So, unlike Bhamra ‘who knew himself to be allergic to eggs,’ they would 
not have ‘every reason to rely without inquiry on Mr Dubb to supply food 
which did not contain egg’, so are likely not to be owed a duty, according to 
the Court’s reasoning. 19  If the duty of care is limited to those aware of 
allergies to food they are unlikely to consume anyway, the significance of the 
ruling in Bhamra is very limited, since very few claimants would be able to sue 
successfully.  
 
The analysis offered in the previous section contrasting W with Y seems to 
suggest that X, like Y, should not be owed a duty: seemingly X (like Y) did not 
rely on the religious character of the event to protect her from allergy-based 
injury and, while she (unlike Y) was owed a duty not to be carelessly subject                                                         
16 The existence of guests suffering from egg allergy is foreseeable, Bhamra 
(n 1) [25]. According to the same incidence assumption (n 1 [23]), egg allergy 
suffered by non-observant guests is also foreseeable. 
17 According to the alternative analysis (n 9 and accompanying text) there 
would be liability towards W but not towards Y and Z. See also n 71 below.  
18 (n 1) [23]. 
19 (n 1) [25]. 
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to religious-based distress, she was not owed a duty to take care not to cause 
her allergy-based injury.20 Nevertheless, on closer examination we shall see 
that X should be owed a duty with respect to the allergy. I will begin the 
discussion under the assumption (held by the Court21) that the incidence of 
allergy among Sikhs is identical to that in the general population. I will later 
argue that this assumption is mistaken, and that this provides a further reason 
to support liability towards X. 
 
Adults with no religious-based dietary restrictions (‘religious restrictions’) are 
likely to be aware of any allergy to commonly-used products. But the same is 
not true for individuals who avoid consuming several products for ethical 
reasons. This is especially true for religious restrictions which often run for 
generations, so a child growing up in an observant family is not likely to be 
exposed to the ‘forbidden’ food throughout their life. So, regardless of whether 
the ‘same incidence’ assumption is correct, an observant Sikh is not likely to 
be aware of her egg allergy; an observant Jew, of seafood allergy; and so on.  
 
The person following a restricted diet for religious reasons cannot know 
whether she is allergic to food she does not eat; usually that possibility would 
not even cross her mind, and for good reason. As long as she follows her 
religious beliefs by not consuming the avoided food, she is free from the risk 
of physical injury from allergy. But this means that her only way of guarding 
herself against the allergy risk is by adhering to the belief-based dietary 
restriction and, concomitantly, by relying on the accuracy of representations, 
even in cases where these representations are made for religious reasons.  
 
Those adhering to religious restrictions are vulnerable. They cannot find out 
whether they are allergic to the forbidden food and therefore cannot take 
steps to hedge against the risk of allergy, other than sticking to the dietary 
restriction. In this sense, they rely on representations made principally for 
religious reasons (and the fact the representation by Dubb was implicit does 
not make it any less conspicuous, nor the reliance on it any less reasonable). 
The vast majority of observant Sikhs with egg allergy would not even be 
aware of the possibility that they have egg allergy, so for them there is no 
reliance in the strong (and common) sense that they change their behaviour 
(in deciding whether to consume a certain food) based on the 
misrepresentation in order to avoid the risk of being physically injured. But 
they too rely in a weaker sense,22 recognized by tort law as sufficient to                                                         
20 This could also be phrased as a legal causation issue: while X was owed a 
duty not to be carelessly subjected to religious-based distress, the additional 
harm she suffered is outside the scope of the relevant risk. 
21 (n 1) [23]. 
22 This weaker form of reliance is sometimes termed ‘general reliance’ but its 
scope, normative status and relationship with the rationale of ‘total control 
over the situation’ are all matters of debate. See Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 
953-955; Pyrenees Shire Council v. Day, (1998) 192 CLR 330, 369-371, 385-
388 (HCA); MK Woodall, ‘Private Law Liability of Public Authorities for 
Negligent Inspection and Regulation’ (1992) 37 McGill LJ 83, 121-122. 
Arguably, the reliance posed by observant claimants unaware of their allergy 
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establish proximity and duty, by being subject to the defendant’s control over 
the situation and not having alternative ways of protecting themselves.23 Put 
differently, observant people are vulnerable to injuries from allergies since 
they do not have a means of knowing whether they suffer from an allergy.  
 
In Watson v British Boxing Board of Control Ltd the claimant, a professional 
boxer, suffered an injury which would arguably have been prevented had he 
received proper treatment immediately. The Court of Appeal based its 
decision that the Board owed a duty to the boxer—to take reasonable care in 
making regulations ensuring that injuries sustained in fights are properly 
treated—on such weak reliance. Strikingly, like the unaware observant guest 
(and unlike Bhamra), boxers ‘would not be in a position to know whether the 
provisions that the Board required to be put in place represented all that it was 
reasonable to provide for [their] safety […and] could reasonably rely upon the 
Board to have taken reasonable care in making provision for their safety … 
professional boxers would be unlikely to have an innate or well informed                                                                                                                                                               
of not being served eggs is stronger than mere ‘general reliance’ and is 
similar to Bhamra’s reliance. 
23 See Perret v Collins [1999] PNLR 77, 91 (CA) (proximity is satisfied since 
the defendant had a ‘measure of control over and responsibility for a situation, 
which, if dangerous, will be liable to injure the claimant’); Watson v British 
Boxing Board of Control Ltd [2001] QB 1134, [77],[78], [85],[87] (‘complete 
control’, absence of an alternative measure of protection and reasonable 
reliance both satisfy proximity and make the imposition of liability fair, just and 
reasonable); White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, 236, 259 (absence of  
alternative measures of protection as a reason to impose a duty); J Stapleton 
‘Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative Opportunities for Deterrence’ 
(1995) 111 LQR 301 (same); Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 
(claimant’s vulnerability as a reason to impose duty of care);  J Stapleton, 
‘The golden thread at the heart of tort law: the protection of the vulnerable’ 
(2003) 24 Aust Bar R 1 (same); E Peel & J Gouldkamp, Winfield and Jolowicz 
Tort (Sweet and Maxwell, 19th ed, 2014) 95 (same); T Keren-Paz, Sex 
Trafficking: A Private Law Response (Routledge, 2013) 154-6 (victims’ 
vulnerability and defendant’s control over the risk as considerations to impose 
duty); A Robertson, ‘Policy-Based Reasoning in Duty of Care Cases’ (2013) 
33 Legal Studies 119, 123 (defendant’s control over risk and victim’s 
vulnerability as considerations – around others, including knowledge of the 
risk, foreseeability and reliance – in establishing proximity); C Witting, ‘Duty of 
Care: An Analytical Approach’ (2005) 25 OJLS 33, 49 (control over risk as 
creating sufficient proximity). A peer reviewer suggested that vulnerability in 
the sense defined above is only sufficient to generate proximity where a 
positive action is at stake or where the intervening act of a third party is not 
relevant. That distinguishes Michael v South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2. 
However, the claim in Michael did not fail for lack of proximity, but rather for 
the (in my opinion, questionable) policy considerations supporting police 
immunity. Indeed, Watson and Michael are hard to distinguish in terms of 
positive action (which existed in neither case) and voluntary act of third party 
(which existed in both cases, although was only illicit in Michael).   
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concern about safety’.24 Observant guests, too, would be unlikely to have a 
well-informed concern about their safety, but they should nevertheless be 
owed a duty.25 I term this reliance weak since, by definition, if boxers do not 
have well informed concern about their safety, they are not likely to decide to 
compete based on a belief that the Board took sufficient measures to protect 
their safety. Nonetheless, their vulnerability, in the sense of the Board’s 
control over the risk and the absence of alternative means of protecting 
themselves, justifies the imposition of a duty on the Board. Similarly, the fact 
that observant guests are unlikely to be aware they have egg allergy, and 
therefore could not show that the assurance against allergic reaction is what 
made them eat the food at the wedding, should not deny Dubb’s duty to act 
with reasonable care to avoid such injury.     
 
If we return to the four reasons offered by the Court as justifying a duty, the 
first three – pre-existing duty not to offend, knowledge that some guests might 
be allergic to eggs and of guests’ expectation not be to served eggs – are 
compatible with extending the duty to all those who suffer from egg allergy but 
are unaware of this fact. If at all, it is more foreseeable that some observant 
guests have allergies of which they are unaware, than that there are 
observant guests who are aware of their allergies. As was explained above, 
that Bhamra was aware of his egg allergy is a conundrum. The fourth factor, 
focusing on Bhamra’s reliance (due to his awareness of being allergic to 
eggs) is neither here nor there. To begin with, it is already redundant to 
factors (2) and (3). Bhamra was an unknown but foreseeable guest with egg 
allergy who would expect not to suffer from an egg allergy-based injury. The 
reliance is not limited to guests who are aware of their allergy. For the 
reasons explained above, the physical safety of those allergic to food they 
avoid for religious reasons depends on adhering to the restrictive diet. 
Therefore, observant Sikhs rely on a ‘no-eggs’ presentation to be protected 
also from physical injury (in addition to spiritual safety) even if (unlike Bhamra) 
they are unaware they are allergic to eggs. 
 
3. Medical vulnerability: increased susceptibility to allergy 
 
So far, the argument assumes that adherence to religious-based dietary 
restrictions does not render the claimant more medically vulnerable to 
physical injury from allergy. The vulnerability which justifies liability in Bhamra 
is based on the claimant’s inability to know whether she has allergy and her                                                         
24 Watson, (n 23) [85]. 
25 This is not to deny that important differences exist between the regulatory 
role of the Board and the position of Mr Dubb. But it is equally important to 
notice that the content of Dubb’s duty is more limited than that of the Board. 
He is not required to arrange for medical assistance against risk which was 
directly created by a third party. Rather, he is required not to negligently 
create a risk of physical injury from food he serves, in circumstances where 
the claimant can expect that eggs would not be served, where the allergy risk 
is foreseeable and the claimant has no alternative way of protecting herself 
from this risk, rather than relying on representation that the food served is 
egg-free.    
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dependence on continuing to adhere to the religious diet in order to be 
protected from allergy-based injury. If it is true that medical sensitivity to 
allergy is positively correlated with adherence to religious dietary restrictions, 
there are even stronger reasons to hold defendants liable for the allergy 
injury.  
 
One can think of two reasons for such increased medical vulnerability. The 
first reason is that, contrary to the court’s assumption, we have reason to 
believe that the incidence of egg allergy is higher among observant Sikhs 
relative to the general population. In the Sikh population there are no 
evolutionary pressures against mutations which create this allergy.26 In the 
general population which has no dietary restrictions, those who were 
genetically prone to egg allergy (at least in its lethal version) had less 
opportunity to procreate and transfer these genes. But such evolutionary 
pressures do not operate on those avoiding eggs. In such populations, 
mutations which would be lethal, were the individual carrying them to 
consume eggs, do not reduce in the slightest the life expectancy of their 
bearers and their ability to procreate, and are therefore likely to be more 
present in the Sikh genome.  
 
Such medical vulnerability is likely to be more relevant to religious-based 
dietary restrictions relative to other ethically-based restrictions. Evolutionary 
pressures require a long period of consistent adherence to make a genetic 
difference. Religious-based adherence may or may not be long enough to 
make a difference, but other ethical beliefs (such as vegetarianism on 
grounds of animal welfare or sustainability) are highly unlikely to be held a 
sufficiently long time to make a genetic difference. 
   
Adherence to religious dietary restrictions might make the claimant more 
sensitive to allergy in a second way. Often, allergic reactions in children are 
more common but less severe than in adults.27 It is therefore better to be 
exposed to the allergenic product at a young age and avoid it later on. A first 
exposure at a later age is more dangerous and is potentially more lethal.                                                         
26 A classic example of evolutionary (also called selective) pressure is that 
created by malaria leading to the selection of the sickle cell hemoglobin gene 
mutation (HbS)—causing sickle cell anaemia—in areas where malaria is a 
major health concern, because the condition grants some resistance to this 
infectious disease. See Ruwende et al, ‘Natural selection of hemi- and 
heterozygotes for G6PD deficiency in Africa by resistance to severe malaria.’ 
Nature 376:246-249 (1995). 
27 See Toral A Kamdar et al, ‘Prevalence and characteristics of adult-onset 
food allergy’ (2015) 3(1) The Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology: In 
Practice 114-115.e1 (The older a patient is when diagnosed with food 
allergies, the more likely that person is to have a severe reaction); Laura E 
Derr, ‘When Food Is Poison: The History, Consequences, and Limitations of 
the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004’, (2006) 61 
Food Drug LJ 65, 71 (at least 8% of children less than 3 years of age and 2% 
of the adult population in the United States have food allergies of varying 
degrees of severity). 
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Adherence to religious diet increases the chance that the first exposure to the 
allergenic product would be at an older age, either because upon becoming 
an adult, the person ceases to observe, or because the exposure is accidental 
and as such might happen at any point during one’s life course. In contrast, 
those not adhering to religious dietary restrictions are likely to be exposed to 
the product at young age. For this reason, adhering to religious diet, by 
significantly increasing the chances of exposure at an older age, renders the 
allergic person more vulnerable to a serious reaction. 
  
 
B. Legal causation analysis: injury from allergy is within the risk of 
religious offense 
 
While foreseeability of damage and of intervening causes is an important 
aspect of legal causation,28 our concern here is with the harm-within-risk rule 
which limits defendants’ liability to harms materializing from the risks which 
made the defendant’s conduct a breach of duty. The rule is referred to as loss 
within the scope of duty, 29 harm within risk, 30 risk principle31 and wrongful 
risks limitation,32 but its meaning is the same. The rule is also explained as 
excluding liability for coincidental harm 33  (‘causal link’ in Calabresi’s 
terminology34). After clarifying that the harm within--risk rule and no liability for 
coincidental harm are different requirements (Section 2), I will defend the view 
that the injury was neither coincidental (Section 3) nor outside of the relevant 
risk (Section 4). First, however, I will explain how defining the relevant duty is 
relevant for the question of scope of liability for consequences, which is a 
legal causation issue.   
 
1. The relationship with duty                                                          
28 Wagon Mound No.1 [1961] UKPC 1; Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] UKHL 
8; A conclusion that the injury or the intervention was not foreseeable could 
also be explained as a sensitive causal relationship which would not continue 
to hold in circumstances that depart in various ways from the actual 
circumstances. J Woodward, ‘Sensitive and Insensitive Causation’ (2006) 115 
Philosophical Review 1-2. See also D Hamer, ‘”Factual Causation” and 
“Scope of Liability”: What's the Difference?’ (2014) 77 MLR 155, 182-7; 
Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 (CA). 
29  South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd, 
(‘SAAMCO’) [1997] AC 191 (HL) 213, 222.  
30 Restatement, Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010) 
§ 29 (liability limited to ‘harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s 
conduct tortious’); M Green and I Gilead, ‘Maligned Misalignments’ (February 
27, 2012). Wake Forest University Legal Studies Paper No. 2014874. 
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014874> accessed 11 
November 2015. 
31 Hamer (n 28) 176. 
32 A Porat, ‘Misalignments in Tort Law’ (2011) 121 Yale LJ 82, 123-9. 
33 Clark and Nolan (n 11) 667. 
34 G Calabresi ‘Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An essay for Harry 
Kalvin Jr’ (1975) 43 University of Chicago Law Review 69, 71. 
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Bhamra raises legal causation issues under alternative understandings of 
Dubb’s duty.35 Under one understanding (defended previously), the relevant 
duty is to act reasonably to avoid personal injury due to egg allergy. This duty 
hinges on guests’ reliance that eggs would not be served (whether or not 
guests are owed a duty to avoid unreasonable religious injury) and requires a 
warning if the food contains eggs. The issue, then, is whether the harm to 
those unaware they are allergic to eggs but who avoid them for other (eg 
religious) reasons is coincidental. Alternatively, if the duty is only to avoid 
religious offence, the question is whether the physical injury, which is different 
from, and additional to, the religious injury, 36  is a harm within the risk that the 
duty was intended to reduce. 37 Under either understanding, the personal 
injury ought to be compensated, for the reasons explained below.  
 
The relevance of the definition of duty to the question of the scope of liability 
for consequences could also be understood in terms of the distinction 
between a duty to warn that a certain product is used and a duty to avoid that 
product altogether. In the absence of special circumstances (such as food 
provided in a Sikh temple) the content of the duty could be at best—and 
contrary to the Court’s point of departure38—to warn against food containing 
eggs; the use of eggs for itself is unproblematic. But where the defendant 
made a ‘free from eggs’ representation (or gave a warranty), serving the eggs 
itself is a breach of duty (not merely failing to warn that eggs were used). This 
raises the question whether there should be liability for injury of a different 
type from that which the duty was purported to prevent. The flipside of this is 
the question whether the claimant’s motivation for not eating eggs, and her 
lack of awareness that she has egg allergy, is relevant at all.                                                          
35 For the overlap between duty and legal causation and the debate whether 
scope of liability for consequences is a matter of duty of care or of remoteness 
see D Nolan, 'Deconstructing the Duty of Care' (2013) 129 LQR 559; J 
Stapleton, ‘Negligent Valuers and Falls in the Property Market’ (1997) 113 
LQR 1; L. Hoffmann, ‘Causation’ (2005) 121 LQR 592.  
36 Bhamra consumed eggs which he felt forbidden to eat on religious grounds 
and to which he was allergic. In principle, his estate is eligible to collect also 
for the spiritual harm, although such recovery depends on answering the 
following questions: ought the claimant be conscious of the fact that he had 
consumed forbidden food? If so, was Bhamra conscious of this fact? Does the 
claim survive death so is available to the estate? Does the size of the award 
depend on the length of the period the claimant was conscious of the fact he 
consumed forbidden food? In Darby v National Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 189, 
the main English authority (discussed below) for the harm-within-risk rule, the 
wrongful risk (Weil’s disease) did not materialize, only the non-wrongful risk of 
drowning.  
37 For lack of appreciation that this is an issue which needs to be addressed 
see Shayna M Sigman, ‘Kosher without Law: The Role of Non-legal Sanctions 
in Overcoming Fraud within the Kosher Food Industry’ 2004 31 Florida State 
UL Rev 509, 548. Sigman assumes that any physical injury due to allergy is 
recoverable. 
38 See n 3 and accompanying text. 
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2. ‘Coincidence’ and ‘harm-within-risk’: two separate requirements 
 
SAAMCO39 and Darby v National Trust40 are seemingly the leading English 
authorities for the harm-within-risk rule. In SAAMCO, the liability of the 
surveyor was limited to the difference between the negligent and accurate 
valuations and did not include the further loss from the general market fall, 
despite the possible satisfaction of the but-for test.41 The reason is that what 
made the valuation negligent is the difference between the negligent and 
accurate valuations at the time of valuation. The valuer was not asked to 
predict, and therefore was not negligent with respect to, the effect of future 
market fluctuations on the value of the property. 
 
Whatever is mandated by the harm-within-risk rule (in negligence) it is clear 
that, at least where the loss is truly coincidental, there should be no liability. 
There is considerable consensus among commentators and judicial opinions 
that a loss is coincidental (and therefore should not lead to liability even if the 
but-for test were satisfied) if the breach did not increase the risk (ie 
probability) the injury would occur.42 The rationale of the rule, and its modus 
operandi are well explained by the Restatement, Third, Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm (2010) (‘Restatement’): when the risk created 
by the actor's tortious conduct did not increase the risk of the harm suffered 
by the other person’ so that ‘greater care by the actor would not reduce the 
frequency of such accidents’, ‘the wrongful aspect of the actor's conduct is                                                         
39 (n 29). 
40 (n 36). 
41 See Stapleton (n 35) 7. 
42  See Clark and Nolan (n 11); J Stapleton, 'Occam's Razor Reveals an 
Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’ (2006) 122 LQR 426; R Stevens, Torts 
and Rights (Oxford University Press 2007) 164; McBride and Bagshaw, Tort 
Law (Pearson, 4th ed,  2013) 306; Hamer (n 28) 177. Lord Hope in Chester (n 
6) [81] captured the test correctly by mentioning that, although the but-for test 
was satisfied, the inherent risk which had materialized 'was not increased, nor 
were the chances of avoiding it lessened' by the defendant's failure to 
disclose it. § 30 of the Restatement (n 30) offers the following test: ‘An actor is 
not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor's conduct was of a 
type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm’.  
But see R Bagshaw ‘Causing the Behaviour of Others and other Causal 
Mixtures’ In R. Goldberg (ed), Perspectives on Causation (Hart Publishing, 
2013) 361,377 who argues that ‘[t]he precise specification of “the coincidence 
rule” in current English law is a matter of controversy’ and that coincidence 
includes instances ‘when the wrongdoing does increase the frequency of the 
type of harm suffered provided that the increase is not sufficiently great to 
establish a basis for regarding the defendant’s action as wrongful’. In 
substance, I agree that insignificant increases of risk should exclude liability 
as a matter of legal causation. However, as explained in the text, this is so by 
operation of the harm-within-risk rule, not the rule against liability for 
coincidental loss. 
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merely serendipitous or coincidental in causing the harm.’ 43  From a 
consequentialist perspective, imposition of liability cannot be justified on 
deterrence, or efficiency grounds.44  
 
Lord Hoffman gave in SAAMCO a textbook example of the harm-within-risk 
rule, which seems to equate this rule with no liability for coincidences. The 
mountaineer with a failing knee dies from an avalanche after receiving 
negligent advice from the physician that his knee could withstand the effort of 
climbing. 45  Clearly, but-for causation is satisfied; but for the advice the 
mountaineer would have stayed at home and would not have died from the 
avalanche. But the negligent advice did not increase the risk of dying from 
avalanche. It merely put the defendant at the time and place in which a risk 
which was not created or increased by the defendant materialized and injured 
the claimant. Under the assumption that Lord Hoffman equates the facts in 
SAAMCO (the market fall) with the mountaineer example, which is a classic 
demonstration of coincidence, SAAMCO is better understood as a modern 
leading authority for no liability for coincidental consequences, rather than for 
the harm-within-risk rule (as follows from Lord Hoffmann’s rhetoric).  
 
Recently, Clark and Nolan viewed the harm-within-risk test and liability for 
coincidence as interchangeable.46 This is a mistake I would like to dispel. The 
rule against liability for coincidence excludes liability for injury whose 
probability (or severity) is not increased by the breach. The harm-within-risk 
rule also excludes liability for injury from risk increased by the breach, if 
preventing this risk was not one of the reasons which made the conduct a 
breach of duty. While in many cases the two requirements overlap, they are 
distinct. As the discussion below will demonstrate, one could think of 
examples in which the harm is within the relevant risk but is still coincidental. 
Therefore, satisfying the harm within risk rule is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for satisfying the no coincidence rule and vice versa. This 
clarification is hardly novel or controversial. It is supported by the 
Restatement47 and by many commentators including Robert Stevens,48 Jane 
Stapleton49 and David Hamer.50 
 
                                                        
43  (n 30) § 30,  comment a.  
44 Calabresi (n 34) 78; Hamer (n 28) 177. 
45 (n 29) 213. 
46 Clark and Nolan (n 11) 664; Hamer (n 28) 177 refers to the exclusion of 
coincidental loss as ‘potentially overlapping’ with the risk principle. See also 
Bagshaw’s view (n 42) which seems to subsume the harm-within-risk rule into 
the rule against liability for coincidences. 
47 (n 30) §§ 29, 30. 
48 Stevens (n 42) 163-9 (separating the discussion between ‘coincidental loss’ 
and the ‘purpose of the right’ as tests for legal causation).  
49  For Stapleton (n 42), the overlap between the limitations shrinks 
considerably due to her very narrow definition of coincidence (critically 
examined below). 
50 (n 28) 177 (‘potentially overlapping’). 
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That coincidence and harm-within-risk are two distinct limitations to liability is 
captured clearly by the Restatement, which dedicates § 29 to the harm-within-
risk rule and § 30 to exclusion of coincidental harm. As explained in the 
Restatement, coincidental loss is excluded even if the type of harm suffered 
by the claimant might be found to be one of the risks arising from the 
defendant’s activity.51 The following three examples illustrate the difference 
between the tests.  
 
The Restatement gives an example for harm outside the scope of the risk the 
handing over of a loaded gun to a child who drops it on her toe.52 Handing 
over the gun increases two risks: shooting and dropping. But what makes the 
handing over negligent is merely the risk of shooting, not the risk of dropping. 
Since the harm was not materialization of the risk which made the conduct 
negligent (shooting) there is no liability, despite the fact the risk of dropping 
the gun was increased by handing it over to the child.   
 
Consider next Darby,53 which is a classic example of correct operation of the 
harm within risk rule. The claimant’s husband drowned in a lake in which there 
was a risk of contracting Weil's disease due to rats urinating in the lake. The 
occupier breached its duty to warn against the risk of contracting the disease 
from swimming in the lake. The but-for test was satisfied – had a warning 
existed the deceased in all likelihood would not have swum so would not have 
drowned. However, the Court correctly held that the injury from which Darby 
died—the drowning—was not a materialization of the risk which made the lack 
of warning negligent—the risk of contracting a disease.  
 
Strictly speaking, however, this is not a coincidence. The breach in not 
warning against swimming in the lake did increase the risk of drowning. 
However, increasing this risk is not negligent. The breach increased two risks, 
one reasonable (drowning) against which there is no need to warn; the other 
unreasonable (contracting disease).  
 
These two examples (rifle dropping; drowning) are different from the 
mountaineer example, in which the failure to warn did not increase the risk 
that avalanche would occur (or that mountaineers would die from avalanche). 
Similarly, the negligent advice in SAAMCO did not increase the probability of 
market fall, nor does speedy driving increase the chance of trees falling or of 
lightning hitting the car at a specific moment.54  
 
Finally, consider the following variation of another illustration in the 
Restatement:55  
                                                         
51 (n 30) §30, illustration 1. 
52 Id §29, illustration 3. 
53 (n 36).  
54 For these examples see Stapleton (n 42) 439-40; Clark and Nolan (n 11) 
664; Chester (n 6) [94]; Restatement (n 30).  
55 (n 30) § 30, illustration 1. In the Restatement’s illustration, a tree falls on car 
while the driver speeds negligently.   
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 Jennifer is speeding at some point of her driving, then she slows down and at 
that moment runs over a child who burst into the road. Jennifer was not 
negligent at the moment she ran the child over. 
 
Speeding does (among other things) increase the likelihood that the driver will 
run over pedestrians (since the driver has less time to react and braking takes 
longer) and the seriousness of the ensuing injury (due to increased 
momentum). So arguably, the child was injured from the risk (hitting a 
pedestrian) which made the behaviour (speeding) a breach of duty. If this is 
correct, liability should be excluded since the injury is a coincidence. At the 
moment the child was hit the driving was not negligent, therefore the risks 
associated with the speedy driving did not eventuate in injury. The historical 
event of speeding neither decreased the available time for identifying the child 
or for braking, nor increased the contact’s impact. All it did was bring the 
driver into the wrong place and time, which is a pure coincidence. Note, 
however, that an alternative explanation could be that the injury was not a 
materialization of the relevant risk – so the risk which made the conduct 
negligent did not eventuate: the injury was neither the result of decreased 
time to react or to brake, nor was its impact increased due to increased 
momentum.  
 
In the first two examples (gun dropped and drowning in an infected lake), the 
risk which materialized was not coincidental (since the breach increased the 
chance it would occur); however, it is still outside the scope of the risk which 
made the conduct a breach. In the third example (speeding, slowing and 
hitting a child), depending on the level of abstraction, the risk could be 
considered as coincidental, despite the fact it was the type of risk which 
makes the conduct a breach of duty. 
 
When the injury is not coincidental, the court needs to decide whether the 
purpose of the duty is to protect the claimant from the risk which eventuated. 
This is an inescapably normative exercise on which reasonable minds will 
differ, as we shall see when applying the harm-within-risk rule to the facts of 
Bhamra. It is also an exercise which necessarily goes back to evaluating 
which risks are unreasonable (standard) and whether the defendant should be 
liable to the claimant for this type of injury (duty).  
 
To conclude: the exclusion of coincidental loss is distinct from the exclusion of 
harm falling outside the relevant risk. Risks that are not increased by the 
breach cannot by definition be part of the reason to hold the conduct a breach 
of duty. But the reverse is not true: risks that are increased by the breach are 
not necessarily wrongful; they are not wrongful if the imposition of a duty was 
not aimed at reducing them.  
 
3. Physical harm is not coincidental 
 
It should be clear from the analysis in the last section that the injury in Bhamra 
to the hypothetical guest unaware of her allergy is not coincidental. As we 
saw, the correct test for coincidence is whether the risk of the harm befalling 
the claimant was increased due to the breach. The answer is clearly in the 
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positive: the harm is a risk of physical injury resulting from an allergy. An 
observant claimant, whether aware of her allergy or not, would not have been 
exposed to that risk had Dubb served food not containing eggs. Once it is 
understood that among all observant Sikhs some have egg allergy, and that 
those allergic to eggs can suffer injury only if they consume food containing 
eggs (either willingly or inadvertently) it becomes clear that the spiritual 
offence and physical injury from allergy risks are locked in together. 
Increasing one risk necessarily increases the other, and therefore the physical 
injury cannot be considered as coincidental.  
 
I would like to defend this conclusion in the light of the broader debate in the 
literature about the correct test for coincidences. Jane Stapleton defines 
coincidental damage as one whose ‘incidence … is not generally increased by 
the breach’. 56  As several commentators correctly observed, 57  Stapleton’s 
application of her coincidence test to Chester v Afshar58 is mistaken. Afshar 
negligently failed to warn Chester of a small inherent risk in the procedure she 
undertook and the risk materialized. There was no negligence in the way the 
procedure was undertaken and, had Chester been warned, she would have 
delayed her consent but eventually would have undergone the procedure.59 
By majority, the House of Lords decided that there should be liability for the 
physical injury, despite the fact that under traditional rules of legal causation 
the injury should have been considered a coincidence. For Stapleton, 
Chester’s injury was not a coincidence, since a warning can affect the total 
incidence of such outcomes (through decreased participation) even though its 
absence does not affect the degree of risk associated with the procedure.60 
But since the purpose of a warning is to give the patient the option to avoid 
running the risk,61 the relevant general incidence is of injuries suffered by 
patients who decide to undergo the procedure, and for this group of claimants 
(like Chester herself) the breach did not increase the incidence of injury and 
(in other words) its probability.  
 
While it is true that a warning might have caused some patients to avoid the 
procedure altogether, this is irrelevant for Chester. Thus, Chester is similar to 
the example of speeding, slowing and injuring without negligence discussed 
above.62 Chester, too, was not injured from what made the failure to inform 
her a breach of duty: the risk that a patient would undergo a procedure only 
because she is not aware of the relevant risks. The risk that materialized - 
injury from a procedure to which the patient was ultimately willing to submit 
                                                        
56 Stapleton (n 42) 438-39.  
57 Clark and Nolan (n 11); Chris Miller, 'Negligent Failure to Warn: Why is it so 
Difficult?' (2012) 28 PN 266, 271-72; Hamer (n 28) fn 126; Stevens (n 42) 52-
53. 
58 (n 6). 
59 (n 6) [7]. 
60 Stapleton (n 42) 441-4. 
61 Chester (n 6) [18] (Lord Steyn); [31] (Lord Hoffman dissenting); [55]-[56] 
(Lord Hope); [98] (Lord Walker); Clark and Nolan (n 11) 666-7. 
62 See text following n 55 above. 
TKP, Bhamra 2, scope of liability  
 19 
had she been adequately informed – is not increased due to failure to warn so 
the ensuing injury is therefore coincidental.63  
 
While Stapleton’s test of coincidence mistakes an absolute increase of injuries 
for an increase of the relevant risk (probability), the conclusion that Bhamra’s 
injury is not coincidental is not subject to the same critique. The opening of a 
supermarket on Sunday contrary to Sunday trading law—an example given by 
Clark  and Nolan to demonstrate their critique of Stapleton’s test64—does not 
increase the risk of customers slipping on spilt yogurt. It only produced a 
setting for the accident to occur. But as long as it cannot be shown that 
customers are more likely to slip on spilt yogurt on Sunday than on other days 
of the week, the injury is coincidental.65 But serving observant Sikhs with food 
containing eggs does not merely set the scene in which the risk of allergy 
injury operates independently of the breach. It is the breach itself that exposes 
the guests to the risk of injury from allergy, a risk that was only created due to 
the breach. The conclusion that the injury is not a coincidence remains valid, 
whatever the claimant’s reasons for avoiding eggs. Consider a claimant who 
was avoiding eggs since being told as a child that eggs caused him wind, 
while being unaware that he is allergic to them. His consumption of eggs 
increased the risk of an allergic injury, so the injury is not coincidental. 
 
If Sikhs are more likely to suffer from egg allergy relative to the general 
population the injury is even less coincidental; this might suggest that one 
purpose of the duty not to serve eggs to observant Sikhs is to avoid allergy 
injury. But this shifts us from discussing coincidental loss to discussing the 
harm-within-risk rule. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
63 Yet the purpose of the duty to fully inform the patient could (and in my 
opinion does) encompass the preservation of the patient’s autonomy, so that 
failing to give adequate information violates this interest and should yield 
compensation. However, the physical injury is not materialization of that other 
risk, so should not be given as damages for the autonomy loss. See Clark and 
Nolan (n 11) 688-91; Stevens (n 42) 53; T Keren-Paz, ‘Compensating Injury to 
Autonomy: Normative Evaluation, Recent Developments and Future 
Tendencies’ (2007) 22 Colman Law Review 187; cf Chester (n 6) [34] (Lord 
Hoffman).  
64 Clark and Nolan (n 11) 672-3.  
65 As an aside, even if it were shown that accidents on Sundays are more 
likely (since, for example, fewer staff are employed on Sundays), liability 
might still be excluded according to the harm-within-risk rule. It might be that 
the purpose of Sunday trading law is only to ensure that employees rest, and 
does not include a purpose of protecting customers from increased risk of 
accidents. Indeed, the latter purpose might undermine the former, for to avoid 
an increased risk of injury to customers, more staff have to be employed, 
contrary to the purpose of Sunday trading law. 
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4. The harm eventuated from a risk which made the serving of eggs a 
breach of duty 
 
Was the increased risk of allergy from serving eggs one of the reasons which 
made the serving of eggs negligent? The relevant background to answering 
this question is the absence of a general duty to warn against egg allergy (the 
Court’s point of departure) and the fact that the ostensible reason for Dubb’s 
duty not to serve eggs in the wedding was to avoid offending the religious 
beliefs of the guests. 
 
Let us focus our attention first on the exposure of a provider of food who 
makes a representation that the food is egg-free. Recovery in Bhamra is 
arguably problematic in terms of the harm-within-risk rule, since the ostensible 
reason to avoid serving eggs was religious and not health-related. Had 
Bhamra purchased ras malai which contained eggs in a vegan restaurant, 
there would have been no doubt that the physical injury (and the religious 
injury) was recoverable. People follow a vegan diet for different reasons, 
ranging from ethical concerns (about animal welfare and sustainability), 
religious concerns, health concerns (eg cholesterol levels) and medical 
concerns such as allergy. The restaurateur cannot know the particular client’s 
motivation for seeking vegan food, but all these motivations, and the 
consequent harm which might follow from a breach, are foreseeable.66 
 
The argument that Dubb should be treated differently from the owner of the 
vegan restaurant is that the ostensible reason to expect Dubb to serve egg-
free food was religious and not medical. However, a ‘free from’ representation 
invites reliance that might protect a different interest from that intended by the 
seller. Such reliance is both foreseeable and reasonable. A kosher butcher 
should not be heard that the injury to the religious feelings of a Muslim 
consuming pork believed to be kosher is outside the scope of his duty, since 
his motivation was to sell kosher food to Jews, and not halal to Muslims. 
Similarly, if a lactose intolerant claimant buys meatballs with sauce from the 
kosher butcher, and the sauce happens to contain milk contrary to kosher 
rules (which prohibit the mixing of meat with dairy products), a physical 
reaction to the milk should give rise to liability. This is so despite the fact that 
the butcher’s motivation was to provide kosher food to observant Jews, not 
lactose-free products, and since the claimant was reasonably and foreseeably 
relying on the meat being kosher, and therefore dairy-free. Dubb’s knowledge 
that his guests would suffer religious offence from the breach could hardly 
serve as a reason to exempt him from liability for the allergy injury, when he 
had a reason to know that some guests might be allergic to eggs and that 
they have no other way of protecting themselves other than adhering to an 
egg-free diet.                                                         
66 In this scenario, liability is likely to be contractual, so there is no need to 
show reliance, and possibly, liability is strict, so it would not depend on 
showing fault on the part of the restaurateur. If, however, the claim is still 
ingrained in negligent misrepresentation, then reliance by all clients, 
regardless of motivation, ought to, and is likely to, be considered as 
reasonable and foreseeable. 
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An attempt to exclude physical harm from the relevant set of wrongful risks is 
problematic for another reason - religious dietary restrictions might have been 
health motivated, at least partially.67 If health concerns were one (potential) 
reason for the development of the religious diet, an attempt to view health 
risks as outside the scope of duty not to serve certain food on religious 
grounds ought to fail. Moreover, separating spiritual and physical injuries 
ignores the problem of mixed motives. The same claimant might want to 
consume product-free food for mixed reasons. To take one example, a 
vegetarian observant Jew has two different reasons not to consume 
McDonald’s chips fried in beef fat.68 All this suggests that it is not so simple to 
exclude certain types of risks as irrelevant for the creation of the duty to avoid 
serving certain types of product. 
 
Let us now turn to the consumer. As explained in Section A, the informational 
vulnerability of observant people ought to lead to a conclusion that the risk of 
allergic reaction to eggs is one of the reasons which makes the serving of 
food containing eggs negligent. To understand further why this informational 
vulnerability justifies liability according to the harm-within-risk principle, recall 
Y - the non-Sikh with unknown egg allergy attending the wedding and 
suffering the same injury as Bhamra.69  For Y, the harm-within-risk rationale 
provides a clear denial of liability because the religious offence and physical 
injury risks are independent. Y is not a beneficiary of the duty to avoid 
religious offence, and since he is not observant he has neither informational 
nor medical vulnerability (ie he does not rely on adherence to religious 
restrictions to protect him from physical injury). Y was merely exposed to the 
risk any member of the general public is exposed to: suffering an allergic 
reaction to a common product upon first encounter.70 Like Darby, who was                                                         
67 For claims that the development of kosher restrictions was health motivated 
see David Bryan, Cosmos, Chaos and the Kosher Mentality (1995) 144-60. 
Certainly, kosher restrictions were explained by some authoritative rabbinical 
scholars as based mainly, or partially, on health concerns; see respectively 
Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed (S Pines trans, Chicago UP, 1963 
[1204]) Pt B, Ch 47; Ramban, Leviticus, ch 11, verse 13. Both scholars were 
12th century Rabbis, philosophers and physicians.  
68 cf Block v McDonald’s Corporation (No 1-03-1763, App. Ct. Ill, 2005). 
69 See Section A1. 
70 Individuals not observing religious restrictions who suffer from egg allergy 
are likely to find out they are allergic to eggs the first time they eat them 
(usually as children). Since they did take the risk of eating eggs (a common 
product) – ie they have neither informational nor medical vulnerability – the 
defendant who first exposed them to eggs should not be liable in negligence. 
 
I have recently argued that those suffering injury from unforeseeable risk 
ought to be compensated based on a restitutionary theory, provided that their 
injury advanced scientific knowledge which would prevent harm from others; 
Tsachi Keren-Paz, ‘Injuries From Unforeseeable Risks Which Advance 
Medical Knowledge—A Restitution-Based Justification for Strict Liability’ 
(2014) 5(3) Journal of European Tort Law 175. But this theory cannot support 
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entitled to be warned against the special risk (Weil’s disease) but not against 
the general risk which materialized (drowning), Y is not entitled to be 
protected from the general risk of allergic reaction, only from the special risk 
of being susceptible to allergy injury due to informational or medical 
vulnerability. Since Y was not an observant Sikh, his harm eventuated from 
the general, not the special, risk.  
 
Y, like Bhamra, but for the opposite reason, is a very unlikely claimant. As a 
non-observant Sikh, he was supposed to have already to found out about his 
egg allergy. If the Sikh wedding was indeed the first time he had consumed 
eggs, or the first time in which his body developed allergic reaction to eggs, 
his injury is merely a coincidence – he could just as well have been injured by 
eating eggs in a pub serving an English breakfast. 71  Dubb’s conduct of 
serving eggs at the wedding was not the but-for cause of Y’s injury, who did 
not rely on the presentation, did not have informational or medical 
vulnerability, would not have changed his behaviour had he been warned, and 
was willing to take the risk of eating eggs.72 In contrast to Y, an observant 
guest is not willing to take the risks associated with eating eggs, so the breach 
did increase the wrongful risk of allergy injury and this risk ultimately 
eventuated.  
 
In summary, the avoidance of allergy risk is an inevitable by-product of 
adhering to religious dietary restrictions, and therefore, a physical injury falls 
within the scope of risk which made the serving of eggs a breach of duty. This 
is the correct conclusion even if we were to define the duty merely as ‘do not 
serve eggs in order to avoid religious offence’. In fact, as the discussion about 
duty of care demonstrates, the correct definition of the duty is ‘do not to serve 
eggs in order to avoid egg allergy’ (whether or not this duty is accompanied by 
a duty to avoid religious offence). This can be seen from the fact that a duty 
should be owed to a non-observant guest, aware of his egg allergy, who 
reasonably relies on eggs not being served at a Sikh wedding. Finally, the 
observant guest’s injury is even more clearly within the scope of the wrongful 
risk if adherence to religious restriction increases the susceptibility to egg                                                                                                                                                               
compensation for a claimant suffering injury from an allergic reaction which is 
already known. The knowledge that the claimant suffers from a known source 
of allergy will not prevent harm from any other individual, so does not benefit 
anyone else. In this sense, Bhamra and X’s cases are different from the one 
in which the patient has an unknown, or hitherto unknowable, sensitivity to a 
new drug. Egg allergy is foreseeable, although unknown in X’s case. When 
the clinician has no reason to know that the patient might be allergic to the 
drug there ought to be no liability in negligence for the reaction to the drug.   
71 Possibly, the but-for test is not satisfied either: Y would have had the same 
injury soon after, but-for Dubb’s negligence. cf n 41 above; Dillon v Twin State 
Gas & Electric Co, 163 A 111 (NH, 1932).  72 Arguably, the breach involved in serving eggs to Y did not increase the risk 
that Y would suffer an injury (a point separate to the lack of but-for causation). 
But this is debatable. If correct, the situation is identical to Chester, in which 
the defendant’s breach did not increase the risk to Chester, since she would 
still have undergone the operation even if she had been warned. 
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allergy – as seems to be the case – or if the religious restriction was 
motivated (even partially) by health concerns. 
